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Abstract—The future power grid will be characterized by the
pervasive use of heterogeneous and non-proprietary information
and communication technology, which exposes the power grid to a
broad scope of cyber-attacks. In particular, Monitoring-Control
Attacks (MCA) –i.e., attacks in which adversaries manipulate
control decisions by fabricating measurement signals in the
feedback loop– are highly threatening. This is because, MCAs
are (i) more likely to happen with greater attack surface and
lower cost, (ii) difficult to detect by hiding in measurement
signals, and (iii) capable of inflicting severe consequences by
coordinating attack resources. To defend against MCAs, we have
developed a semantic analysis framework for Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) in power grids. The framework consists of two
parts running in parallel: a Correlation Index Generator (CIG),
which indexes correlated MCAs, and a Correlation Knowledge-
Base (CKB), which is updated aperiodically with attacks’ Corre-
lation Indices (CI). The framework has the advantage of detecting
MCAs and estimating attack consequences with promising run-
time and detection accuracy. To evaluate the performance of the
framework, we computed its false alarm rates under different
attack scenarios.
Index Terms—Power Grid, Cyber-Physical Systems, Cyber-
Security, Monitoring-Control Attacks, Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE power grid is evolving with increasing dependencyon Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).
Today, ICT is realized in energy control centers through
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
and Energy Managment Systems (EMS). While EMSs make
commands for power grid operation, SCADA systems serve
as the gateway between EMS and field networks by passing
measurements and control commands. The present SCADA is
in the fourth generation of architectures, which bring inno-
vative and cost-efficient solutions, such as cloud computing
and Internet of Things, while opening up a much wider
scope of cyber-security concerns among utilities [1]. Since
the notorious Stuxnet attack to Siemens SIMATIC WinCC
SCADA system in July 2010, approximately 45,000 cases
of SCADA infection around the world have been reported,
including the Iranian nuclear facilities and the Ukrainian power
grid, according to Symantec’s statistics [2]. These attacks, if
C. Moya and J.K. Wang are with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210 USA e-mail:
{moyacalderon.1,wang.6536}@osu.edu.
J. Hong is with the Energy and Automation Department, ABB US Corporate
Research Center, Raleigh, NC, 27519 USA e-mail: junho.hong@us.abb.com.
successful, would lead to massive power outages, resulting in
severe physical, economic, and social impacts.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are redeemed critical to
protecting SCADA from cyber-attacks. In contrast to those
methods aiming at strengthening the perimeter surrounding
SCADA, IDSs generate ‘burglar alarms’ whenever the se-
curity of the system is compromised [3]. To increase the
chances of mounting a successful defense, the Department of
Homeland Security recommends a combination of firewalls,
De-militarized Zones, and IDSs grounded on the principle of
defense-in-depth [4].
While IDSs for traditional ICT systems are mature, im-
plementing IDS in industrial control systems, such as power
grids’ SCADA, is facing unprecedented challenges in twofold.
First, the power grid is a cyber-physical system, wherein
continuity of operation is critical. Unlike traditional ICT
systems, in which the effects of false alarms are limited
to computer operations, false alarms in power grids would
disrupt dependent vital physical processes and inflict severe
consequences. Therefore, false positive (which falsely gen-
erates alarms for normal actions) is unacceptable whereas
low false negative rate is desired. Second, the power grid is
a real-time dynamical system. Any delay of control actions
could lead to instabilities from local plant angle instability to
inter-area oscillation [5]. In the extremity, delayed response
of protective devices will cause cascading blackouts over a
large scale. For this reason, propagation latency of control
and measurement signals induced from IDS audit and process
must be minimized.
To address the first challenge, recent works develop IDS
by integrating contextual information of power grids [6]–[12].
The most common approach is to identify attacks based on
their impact on power grids. For example, in [12], Bayesian
network models for the whole cyber-infrastructure and under-
lying power grids are constructed based on SCADA logs along
with power network topological information. Power contin-
gencies are then simulated on the Bayesian model to rank the
severity of a detected cyber-intrusion. In [6], [10], [13], IDSs
audit and select packets that contain control commands, which
(dis)connect grid components, e.g., generators, transmission
lines and substations. Cyber-attacks are identified if the power
flow diverges in simulation under those control commands.
Another approach is to calibrate the detection results in
cyber-space with historical data of power grid operation,
wherein data mining techniques are often applied. For exam-
ple, deviations between current and historical Area Control
2Errors are used as indicators of cyber-attacks to Automatic
Generation Control in EMS [9]. A hybrid IDS is developed in
[7] that learns temporal state-based specifications for power
grid scenarios of physical disturbances, cyber-attacks, and
normal operations.
However, both of these approaches share the common
deficiency of requiring a long runtime, exacerbating the second
challenge. While the former approach simulates power grids’
response, which is a non-trivial task given the enormous
size of power networks and the number of grid devices, the
latter approach relies on frequent auditing and processing
historical data over a sufficiently long period in order to ensure
the desired accuracy. These put a high requirement on IDS
accounting resources and could significantly reduce IDSs’ per-
formance in timely processing and propagating the information
to grid functions and responsible defense authorities.
Despite initial attempts on reducing IDS runtime in [6], [14],
they are restricted to certain attack groups, wherein attacks are
aimed at individual grid components and assume a single step
in the cyber-physical causal chain (i.e., adversaries directly
disconnect grid devices through remote control); they are not
able to handle more sophisticated attacks that are coordinated
and through EMS. These attacks are defined as Monitoring-
Control Attacks (MCA) and considered highly threatening [15],
because they are (i) more likely to happen with greater attack
surface and lower attack cost, (ii) difficult to detect by hiding
in measurement signals and masquerading through EMS, and
(iii) capable of inflicting much more severe consequences at a
greater scale by coordinating attack resources targeting at mul-
tiple grid components. Although MCAs’ attack mechanisms
and physical impacts have been studied in a few works [16]–
[19], there is no effective IDS solution available to defend
against MCAs.
To bridge this gap, this paper presents a semantic analysis
framework for IDSs in power grids, which detects MCAs with
promising runtime and detection accuracy. The framework
is implemented as two parts running in parallel in IDS: a
Correlation Index Generator (CIG), which indexes correlated
attacks, and a Correlation Knowledge-Base (CKB), which is
updated aperiodically with attacks’ Correlation Indices (CI).
In addition, this paper makes the following contribution:
• A theoretical basis for CIG. We formulate MCAs as a
bi-level mix-integer optimization program and solve it to
provide CI solutions.
• A suite of detection rules for CKB. Derived from set
theory, these rules characterize the relation between ad-
versaries’ goals and coordinated attacks, thus enabling
CKB to detect MCAs at runtime.
• Defense strategies against MCAs. While most IDSs are
passive, that is, they only generate “burglar alarms”,
our proposed method actively derives defense strategies
against MCAs using a set-theoretic approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the threat model, MCAs mechanisms and IDS
implementation of the proposed semantics framework. Section
III presents the mathematical model of power grids and MCAs.
The theoretic basis for CIG and detection rules for CKB are
derived in Section IV and V. In Section VI, the performance of
proposed semantic framework is demonstrated with numerical
experiments. Finally, all results of this paper are concluded
in Section VII. While the proposed framework is capable of
defending against less sophisticated attacks, such as control at-
tacks, we elaborate the framework’s working principle mainly
based on MCAs in this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to develop the semantic analysis framework for
IDSs in power grids, we need to consider three factors: the
environment in which intrusions occur (the threat model),
the intrusions we wish to detect (MCAs), and the intrusion
detector (IDS implementation).
A. Threat Model
In the previous generations, SCADA activities were basically
confined to proprietary networks. In contrast, the current fourth
generation of SCADA is mostly internet-based, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. In particular, a large amount of measurement signals
from transducers of grid equipment (e.g., relays, generators
and switch gears) are transmitted with raw data protocol in
field networks [3]. This widens the cyber-attack surface in the
following attack entry points as numbered in Fig. 1 [1]:
(1) Directly hack into field devices, including transducers,
actuators and meters.
(2) Attack field network links between devices and from
devices to Energy Control Centers (ECC).
(3) Attack from inside of the ECC. This could happen within
or external of the security enclaves, which boundaries
are defined by the trust nodes (e.g., firewall and IDS)
[20].
(4) Attack from inside enterprises functions or attack at its
perimeter networks.
Through these chanels, adversaries can install malware,
sniff, inject and modify host files and network traffic [1],
[21], [22]. Based on the above fact, we make the following
assumptions about the threat model:
1) Adversaries can remotely penetrate the Local Area Net-
work (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN). Though
insider attacks outside security enclaves are allowed
under the proposed framework, it is not our focus. We do
not consider insider attacks within the security enclaves.
2) In ECC, we trust EMS. In other words, attacks are only
executed on packets containing control and measurement
signals that are transmitted over the network; they do not
damage the EMS functions nor alter its encoded working
principles.
3) IDSs are secure (i.e., not compromised). In addition, we
assume there are separate computing machines dedicated
to IDSs that implement the proposed semantic analysis
framework. Therefore, IDSs do not introduce extra vul-
nerabilities into power grids.
4) IDS communication is secure. In other words, IDSs can
safely exchange data.
5) We do not consider attacks through enterprises func-
tions. Launching MCAs through this path, though the-
oretically possible, is much more likely to fail due to
extra layers of trust nodes.
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Fig. 2. Control and measurement attacks. u : control command, y :
measurements. u 6= u˜ (y 6= y˜) during the cyber-attack, where u˜ and y˜ are
the corrupted control and measurement signals.
B. Monitoring-Control Attacks
There are two clases of attack mechanisms in power grids,
control attacks and monitoring attacks [15]. They are illus-
trated in with a generic control diagram in Fig. 2. Control
attacks refer to attacks that directly hijack and falsify control
commands in power grids, such as disconnecting transmission
lines and changing the power output of generators [6], [14],
[21]. While able to inflict immediate physical consequences,
they are less likely to occur in practice due to the re-
stricted communication channels and easiness of detection.
For example in conventional substations, relay commands,
which trigger circuit breakers, are usually transmitted over
proprietary communication channels or hard wire connection;
generator power adjustments are requested through Human
Machine Interface (HMI), where operators would block and
report suspicious actions.
Monitoring attacks contaminate or eavesdrop measurements
collected from transducers. In contrast to control commands,
measurement signals have been more often transmitted over
SCADA
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Dispatch
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Fig. 3. Attack Paths on EMS. In path 1, the adversary go through State
Estimation and its screening methods. In path 2, the adversary can inject any
attack signal that deceives the operator.
open-communication channels (i.e., without any available au-
thentication method) due to their large transmission volume
and high transmission rate. This opens a wider cyber-surface
to attacks. An important subset of monitoring attacks is
Monitoring-Control Attacks, in which adversaries manipulate
control decisions by fabricating measurement signals in the
feedback loop. On one hand, MCAs are difficult to detect,
since the attack goals are hidden behind measurements and
the control mechanisms. Thus, they cannot be inspected and
intervened by human operators. On the other hand, they can
inflict severe consequence by coordinating attack resources
targeting at many measurements simultaneously; they are dif-
ferent from non-disruptive monitoring attacks that only exploit
private information. Therefore, MCAs are considered highly
threatening.
MCAs’ mechanism in power grids is briefed next. Main
control functions of the power grid are realized through EMS,
which consists of four blocks: network model-building (includ-
ing topology processor and state estimation), security assess-
ment, automatic generation control, and dispatch. Information
flows within EMS are shown in Fig. 3. In path 1, contaminated
measurements drive control decisions in automatic generation
control and dispatch after going through network-building
models. While state estimation could effectively correct and
identify bad data, a rich body of literature has demonstrated
that contaminated measurements can still be injected through
when the measurement errors are within the tolerance and/or
the measurements are structure-wise conforming [23]–[25].
In path 2, contaminated measurements directly drive control
decisions, as it is common for system operators to make a
decision based on raw measurements in security constrained
dispatch. Through both paths, adversaries may realize goals,
such as depriving profit in electricity markets, disturbing
power grid frequency and overloading grid equipment, causing
tremendous financial losses, sabotaging, or even interrupting
continuous grid operation.
C. IDS Implementation
1) Proposed Framework in IDS Architecture: A general
IDS architecture is defined with four modules, Event (E-
blocks), Analysis (A-blocks), Database (D-blocks), and Re-
sponse (R-blocks), as shown in Fig. 4 [26]. The proposed
semantic analysis framework has two parts: Correlation Index
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Generator (CIG) and Correlation Knowledge Base (CKB).
They are aimed to provide contextual information of power
grids additional to the traits that IDS sensed in the cyber-space
(e.g., host syslog and network traffic).
CIG, depicted in Fig. 5, belongs to A-blocks. It analyzes
the correlation of the potential hostile behaviors sensed by E-
blocks, and indexes these behaviors with inductive-deductive
patterns. For example, if a set of measurements are suspected
to be contaminated, CIG first induces their consequence on the
power grid with optimal power flow. If a transmission line is
overloaded, then these measurements are weakly correlated.
Next, CIG deduces the critical measurements required to
overload the transmission line. These critical measurements
are strongly correlated and will be represented by a set
of Correlation Indices (CI). The inductive-deductive patterns
ensure minimal false negative rates that might be caused by
normal deviations, such as noises and faults. In addition, CIG
can be used to protect critical grid assets fromMCAs, in which
case CIs can be directly deduced from the predicted failures
of these assets. Details about CIG are provided in Section IV.
CKB, depicted in Fig. 6, belongs to D-blocks. It is updated
with the CIs generated from CIG at an adaptive rate, which is
determined by (i) configuration change of power networks,
(ii) power grid stress level, (iii) detection rate of potential
hostile events of E-blocks, and (iv) human operator’s settings.
At runtime, measurements detected by E-blocks are compared
with the CIs in CKB. If the comparison is positive, then
these measurements are considered forming an MCA. This
IDSs' sensors - E-blocks
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Reasoning Engine
Physical Targets
and
Defense Strategies
NO
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From CIG
Critical
Targets
Calling CIG
Fig. 6. Correlation Knowledge Base (CKB).
information is passed to other A-blocks and R-blocks for
further response. Since CKB does not contain any computation
function, apart from arithmetic operation for CI comparison, it
allows fast contextual information integration in IDSs. Details
about CKB are provided in Section V.
Derived from set theory, defense strategies are proposed for
R-blocks. The design of E-blocks is out of the scope of this
paper.
2) IDS Dimensions: We consider two dimensions of IDS
implementation related to the proposed semantic analysis
framework. The proposed framework is flexible in implemen-
tation in the other dimensions, such as audit source (i.e., host-
or network-based detection), audit frequency and continuity,
which definitions are given in the survey [27].
Detection Approach. There are two main detection ap-
proaches in IDS development: signature- and anomaly-
based. In between these approaches lie the probabilistic-
and specification-based methods [1], [27], [28]. All of these
approaches are based on direct knowledge of cyber-activities
(i.e., host syslog and network traffic). In complementary,
behavioral detection approaches capture the patterns, which
are not necessarily illegitimate in a direct setting but wrong in
a contextual setting as a secondary evidence. The proposed
analysis framework belongs to the last class and will be
implemented with other direct knowledge-based approaches
in IDS.
Distributed v.s. Centralized. The proposed analysis frame-
work can be implemented under centralized, distributed or
hierarchical structure of IDS. Provided the cost and communi-
cation constraints in power grids, we consider IDSs are only
installed at the substation level and above, but not at individual
Intelligent Electronic Devices or Remote Terminal Units.
Thus, under a centralized structure, the proposed framework
will allow IDS at a substation to detect and identify MCAs
within its service area. For MCAs across service areas under
multiple substations, a distributed structure is needed, wherein
IDS at substations have peer-to-peer communication so that
detected events can be exchanged. Alternatively, a hierarchical
structure can be formed. The proposed analysis framework is
integrated at a master IDS, which supervises all the substation
IDSs by collecting, analyzing their detected events and sending
instructions for detected MCAs.
5III. MATHEMATICAL MODELS
In this section, we model the power grid, dispatch applica-
tions, and Monitoring Control Attacks.
A. Mathematical Notation
Throughout this paper, we use the following mathematical
notation. Let R and R≥0 (resp. R>0) denote the set of real
numbers and the set of non-negative (resp. positive) real
numbers. We let 1 and 0 denote, respectively, the vectors or
matrices with all components equal to one and zero. Given a
finite set V , we let |V | denote its cardinality, i.e., the number
of elements of V , and 2V the power set of V , i.e., the set of
all subsets of V .
For a matrix A ∈ Rn×m, we let [A]i denote its ith row.
For a vector x ∈ Rn, xi denotes its ith element, diag(x) the
diagonal matrix of x, and ||x||0 the zero-norm of x, i.e., the
number of non-zero elements of x.
B. Power Grid Model
We model the power grid as the graph G = (V,E), where
V is the set of n buses and E ⊂ V × V is the set of
m transmission lines. To each bus i ∈ V , we associate
the demand (or consumption) Pd,i ∈ R≥0. In addition, let
Vg ⊂ V denote the set of ng buses with dispatchable
generation. To each generator bus i ∈ Vg , we associate
the power generated Pg,i ∈ R>0. Similarly, to each trans-
mission line l := (i, j) ∈ E connecting buses i and j,
we associate the power flow Pf,l ∈ R. In vector form,
the demand, generation, and power flows are, respectively,
Pd = [Pd,1, Pd,2, . . . , Pd,n]
⊤, Pg = [Pg,1, Pg,2, . . . , Pg,ng ]
⊤,
and Pf = [Pf,1, Pf,2, . . . , Pd,m]
⊤.
The power grid is assumed to have a set of ns substations,
i.e., S := {s1, s2, . . . , sns}. We model the power grid within
substation sk’s service area as the sub-graphGsk = (Vsk , Esk)
with the following properties:
1) All substations’ service areas compose the power grid,
i.e., G = ∪sk∈SGsk .
2) Substations’ service areas might overlap, i.e., for some
sj , sk ∈ S, we may have Gsj ∩Gsk 6= ∅.
3) The overlapped areas do not contain generator buses.
4) Each substation sk collects demand measurements, de-
noted as P˜d ∈ Rn≥0, within its service area, i.e., all P˜d,i
such that i ∈ Vsk .
C. Dispatch Application Model
Dispatch applications in EMS compute the generation out-
put for the grid, denoted as P+g ∈ R
ng
>0, by observing de-
mand measurements P˜d and using security constrained optimal
power flows. These applications are triggered based on a guard
condition (i.e., a boolean condition). This guard condition is
enabled by a security assessment algorithm (which usually
involves network model-building), or by a system operator
during real-time and contingency dispatch. Examples include
generation dispatch in Real-Time Markets and Ancillary Ser-
vices (see Fig. 3).
Dispatch applications are based on the active and reactive
power flow model, which describes how power balances on
buses and flows on transmission lines. However, comput-
ing this coupled power flow may become computationally
intractable for large-scale power grids. For this reason, the
decoupled DC power flow is commonly adopted by operators
when the power grid is in the normal status [29]. The lin-
earity and sparsity in the DC power flow allows much faster
computation.
We formulate the security constrained DC optimal power
flow as a convex optimization problem that minimizes the
generation cost (1a), balances generation and demand (1b),
and keeps the generation (1c) and power flows (1d) within
operational limits, i.e.,
Ω(P˜d) : min
Pg
1
2
P⊤g C2Pg + c
⊤
1 Pg + c0, (1a)
s.t. 1⊤Pg − 1
⊤P˜d = 0, (1b)
Pg ∈ [0, P¯g], (1c)
F (ΠgPg − P˜d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Pf
∈ [−P¯f , P¯f ], (1d)
where c0, c1, c2 ∈ Rn≥0 are the cost coefficients for generators,
C2 = diag(c2), P¯g ∈ Rn≥0 is the rated power from generators,
P¯f ∈ Rm≥0 is the thermal capacity of transmission lines, F ∈
R
m×n is the generator shift matrix, and Πg ∈ {0, 1}
n×ng is
a matrix that maps generator buses to buses.
Thus, given the demand measurements P˜d, an optimal
solution P+g ∈ Ω(P˜d) corresponds to the new generation
output for the grid.
D. Attack Model
In this subsection, we define MCAs, attack goals, and attack
constraints. We also describe two types of MCAs: strongly and
weakly correlated.
Monitoring Control Attacks: MCAs aim to manipulate dis-
patch applications in EMS. In an MCA, adversaries hack into
substations’ ICT. The corrupted measurements are modeled as
follows:
P˜d(a) = Pd + a, (2)
where a ∈ Rn denotes the difference between the attack signal
P˜d(a) and the actual signal Pd.
Attack Goal: The adversary uses these MCAs to manipu-
late (1), so the new (deceived) generation output P+g (a) ∈
Ω(P˜d(a)) increases the power flows on a set of target
lines L ⊂ E. Therefore, the attack goal is denoted as,
Gα,j := {(l, τl) : [F ]l(ΠgP
+
g (a)− Pd) ≥ (1 + τl)Pf,l(0)}.
(3)
where Gα,j ⊂ E ×R>0 is the attack goal, [F ]l is the lth row
of the generation shifting matrix, Pf,l(0) denotes the power
flow on line l ∈ L before the MCA, and τl ∈ R>0 quantifies
the flow increase on l ∈ L. We choose this flow increase τl
with semantics, including the flow increase that congests a
transmission line or trips the line’s protection.
6Attack Constraints: MCAs are constrained based on the
path they take on EMS. If the attack takes path 1 (see Fig. 3),
the MCA gets through state estimation and its data screening
method. If the attack takes path 2 (see Fig. 3), the MCA must
take any value that deceives the operator. In any case, we can
model this constraint as
a ∈ [−a¯, a¯]. (4)
In the above, a¯ ∈ Rn≥0 is the vector of max values allowed for
the attack signal. We can use this vector to design different
attack scenarios.
Remark 1. The constraint for path 1 can take a form that
explicitly describes the condition under which measurement
attacks get trough state estimation and its data screening
methods. These methods, however, are not used during real-
time and contingency dispatch (Path 2).
MCAs are also constrained by defense at substations. If the
grid’s operator deploys defense at substation sk, the adversary
cannot corrupt its measurements. We model this constraint as
ai ∈ δsk [−a¯i, a¯i], ∀i ∈ Vsk , ∀sk ∈ S, δsk ∈ {0, 1}. (5)
where δsk = 1 if measurements at substation sk are corruptible
and δsk = 0 if not. The vector δ = [δs1 , δs2 , . . . , δsns ]
⊤
describes target and safe substations during MCAs. Using δ,
we can identify the set of target/attacked substations as follows
Sα,j := {sk ∈ S : δsk = 1} ∈ 2
S.
Note that we can also use (5) to model the desire (for the
adversary) to attack substation sk.
Finally, MCAs are constrained by the adversary’s resources.
If the adversary has limited resources, (s)he can only attack
(hack) a limited number of substations. We model this con-
straint as
||δ||0 ≤ κ, κ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ns}. (6)
In the worst case scenario for the operator, the adversary
minimizes κ.
Types of Coordinated MCAs: Since the power grid is built
with redundant measurements, attacking measurements in a
single substation may not induce any consequence. In other
words, effective MCAs are usually launched as a coordinated
effort, which consists of temporally and spatially correlated
events. Given the attack goal Gα,j , we classify coordinated
MCAs as strongly and weakly correlated. Strongly Correlated
MCAs, denoted as S∗α,j ∈ 2
S , achieve Gα,j by attacking
the least number of substations. Strongly correlated MCAs
describe attacks with minimum resources and allow us to
predict attack consequences and derive defense implications.
In Section IV, we will introduce a formal method to model and
study strongly correlated MCAs. On the other hand, Weakly
Correlated MCAs, denoted as Sα,j ∈ 2S , achieve Gα,j by
attacking more substations than needed. Adversaries execute
weakly correlated MCAs to probe defense at substations.
IV. CORRELATION INDEX GENERATOR
In this section, we describe the working principles of the
Correlation Index Generator (see Fig. 5) and its components,
namely the Induction Engine and the Deduction Engine.
A. Induction Engine
Suppose the E-blocks detected an MCA Sα,j ∈ 2S that
is not in CKB and has corrupted measurements P˜d(a). The
induction engine computes the new (deceived) generation
output P+g (a) by solving Ω(Pd + a) =: Ω(P˜d(a)), i.e.,
Ω(P˜d(a)) : min
Pg
1
2
P⊤g C2Pg + c
⊤
1 Pg + c0,
s.t. 1⊤Pg − 1
⊤(Pd + a) = 0,
Pg ∈ [0, P¯g],
F (ΠgPg − (Pd + a)) ∈ [−P¯f , P¯f ].
Then, using P+g (a) ∈ Ω(P˜d(a)), the induction engine
determines the set of attack consequences, i.e., the set Gα,j .
As shown in (3), the set of consequences Gα,j depends on τl
and Pd. The flow increase τl is chosen with semantics and the
real consumption Pd is obtained as follows.
Pd,i :=
{
P˜d,i, if i 6∈ Vsk , ∀sk ∈ Sα,j ,
P pred,i , otherwise,
where P pred,i is a (conservative) estimated consumption or a
redundant measurement.
B. Deduction Engine
Given the set of consequences inflicted Gα,j , the deduction
engine computes strongly correlated MCAs that reach Gα,j
using the following bilevel mix-integer optimization program:
min
P
+
g ,a,κ,δ
κ, (7a)
s.t. equations (2)− (6), (7b)
P+g ∈ Ω(P˜d(a)). (7c)
In our previous work [30], we derived a method that
addresses the mathematical challenges of (7) and computes
strongly correlated MCAs. The method first computes the
security index, which corresponds to the optimal solution κ∗.
This security index describes the minimum number of sub-
stations the adversary must attack to reach Gα,j . Then, the
method determines the target and safe substations during the
MCA from the optimal solution δ∗. Since δ∗ is not necessarily
unique, we proposed in [30] an algorithm to determine all
feasible solutions δ∗ such that ||δ∗||0 = κ∗. All these δ∗
correspond to strongly correlated MCAs associated with the
attack goal Gα,j .
We use a set-theoretic approach to describe all these
strongly correlated MCAs, which we define as Correlation
Indices.
Definition 1. Let δ∗ denote a feasible solution of (7) as-
sociated with Gα,j such that ||δ∗||0 = κ∗. A Correlation
Index (CI), denoted as S∗α,j , is a strongly correlated MCA
that extracts target substations from δ∗ as follows
S∗α,j := {sk ∈ S : δ
∗
sk
6= 0} ∈ 2S,
and inflicts the consequences described by Gα,j .
The set of all CIs associated with the inflicted conse-
quences Gα,j is given by S∗α,j := {S
∗
α,j : S
∗
α,j is a CI}.
7As a result, the CIG generates a CI-target tuple (S∗α,j , Gα,j)
–i.e., the set of strongly correlated MCAs and the associated
inflicted consequences– and sends this CI-target tuple to the
Correlation Knowledge-Base (CKB).
V. CORRELATION KNOWLEDGE-BASE
In this section, we describe the working principles of the
Correlation Knowledge-Base (CKB) (see Fig. 6) using a set-
theoretic approach. The CKB has a Scanning Engine and a
Reasoning Engine.
A. Scanning Engine
Suppose the E-blocks detected a (possibly weakly corre-
lated) MCA Sα,j . The Scanning Engine verifies if Sα,j is an
existing MCA, i.e., if Sα,j ∈ CKB. The MCA Sα,j is an
existing MCA if
1) The MCA is a CI (or strongly correlated MCA), i.e.,
Sα,j ∈ S∗α,j for some S
∗
α,j ∈ CKB.
2) The MCA is a weakly correlated MCA but a superset of
at least one CI, i.e., ∃S∗α,j ⊂ Sα,j such that S
∗
α,j ∈ CKB.
3) The MCA is uncorrelated, is a subset of at least one CI,
i.e., ∃S∗α,j ⊃ Sα,j such that S
∗
α,j ∈ CKB, and has less
cardinality than all CIs in CKB, i.e., |Sα,j | < |S∗α,j | for
all S∗α,j ∈ CKB.
If Sα,j is an existing MCA, then CKB uses the reasoning
engine to identify physical targets and derive defense strate-
gies. Otherwise, CKB calls the CIG to analyze Sα,j .
B. Reasoning Engine
The reasoning engine identifies physical targets and derives
defense strategies for the detected MCA Sα,j . Technically, the
reasoning engine is an R-block (see Fig. 4) and can work also
with CIG to derive defense strategies.
To identify physical targets associated with Sα,j , we pro-
ceed as follows.
1) If the MCA Sα,j is a CI, then the physical targets are
described by the set of inflicted consequences Gα,j .
2) If the MCA Sα,j is a weakly correlated MCA that
contains a set of q ≥ 2 CIs, i.e., the set
SCI := {S
∗
α,j : j = 1, . . . , q and S
∗
α,j ⊂ Sα,j},
then the physical targets are given by the union of
the inflicted consequences associated with each CI, i.e.,
∪qj=1Gα,j where (S
∗
α,j , Gα,j) is a CI-tuple of an existing
MCA.
To derive defense strategies against Sα,j , we proceed as
follows.
1) If the MCA Sα,j is a CI, then the best defense strategy
is to defend any substation.
This defense will render the attack ineffective, which we
justify next.
Proposition 1. (Defense against strongly correlated MCAs)
Let Sα,j denote a strongly correlated MCA. If the operator
protects measurements at any substation substation s∗k such
that s∗k ∈ Sα,j , the attack Sα,j \ {s
∗
k} becomes ineffective.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Fig. 7. New England 39-bus system.
2) If the MCA Sα,j is a weakly correlated MCA that
contains the set of CIs SCI, then we may have one of
the following cases.
Case I: If ∩qj=1S
∗
α,j 6= ∅, then the best defense strategy is
to protect measurements at substation s∗k that satisfies s
∗
k ∈
∩qj=1S
∗
α,j , which we justify next.
Proposition 2. (Defense against a set of strongly correlated
MCAs with non-empty intersection) Let Sα,j denote a weakly
correlated MCA that contains the set of CIs SCI. Suppose
these CIs satisfy ∩qj=1S
∗
α,j 6= ∅. If the operator protects
measurements at a substation s∗k such that s
∗
k ∈ ∩
q
j=1S
∗
α,j ,
the attack Sα,j \ {s∗k} becomes ineffective.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1.
Case II: If ∩qj=1S
∗
α,j = ∅, then the best strategy is to defend
all CIs individually, which we justified using Proposition 1.
Case III: Finally, there is an intermediate case in which only
some CIs have a non-empty intersection. For this case, a
combination of the defense strategies described for Case I and
II should be implemented.
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we use numerical experiments to validate
our proposed framework. In particular, we compute the false
alarm rates for CIG and CKB under different attack scenarios.
A. Experimental Setup
We describe the experimental environment, the IDS bench-
mark systems, and the evaluation metric next.
1) Environment: We model a power grid with ns = 6
substations using the New England 39-bus system illustrated
in Fig. 7. We model the dispatch application using the DC
Optimal Power Flow tool from MatPower [31]. The data used
for the power grid and dispatch application corresponds to
Matpower base-case data.
In our experiments, we used the adversarial environment
introduced in [32]. This adversarial environment is character-
ized by a nominal attack rate (or attack intensity) p0 ∈ (0, 1),
which E-blocks estimate as pˆ0.
8We model MCAs using a random approach, that is, we
selected the corrupted measurements P˜d(a) and target sub-
stations Sα,j uniformly at random. In particular, P˜d(a) was
chosen uniformly from the interval [Pd − a¯, Pd + a¯] where
a¯ = 0.1Pd. This random approach allowed us to model attack
events that are a threat and attack events that are not.
2) Intrusion Detection Systems: We model E-blocks (or
IDS’s detector) with the following characteristics. The E-
blocks have a detection rate pD ∈ (0, 1) and a false alarm
rate pFA ∈ (0, 1). In our experiments, we selected the
values of pD = 0.9, pFA = 0.1. The adversary attempts
to manipulate the E-blocks’ pD, pFA, and pˆ0 by using the
following parameters:
• δ: the maximum deviation under pˆ0.
• β: the maximum probability to launch a zero-day (i.e.,
undetectable) attack.
• α: the maximum probability to intentionally trigger a
false alarm.
In the simulation, we selected the values δ = 0.1pˆ0, β = 0.2,
α = 0.1, and pˆ0 ∈ {0.25, 0.1, 0.05}.
We model two benchmark IDSs, a simple IDS (IDS-1) and
a Bayesian IDS (IDS-2). IDS-1 has the following working
principle. If the E-blocks trigger an alarm, IDS-1 will label
the event as an intrusion. IDS-2, on the other hand, has
the following working principle. An event is labeled as an
intrusion based on P(Intrusion|Alarm), i.e., the probability
of intrusion given that an alarm has been triggered. This
probability is computed as follows
P(I|A) =
P(A|I)P(I)
P(A|I)P(I) + P(A|¬I)P(¬I)
,
where A denotes the alarm and I intrusion. Since P(I) = pˆ0,
P(A|I) = pD, P(¬I) = 1 − pˆ0, and P(A|¬I) = pFA; we
write P(I|A) as
P(I|A) =
pDpˆ0
(pD − pFA)pˆ0 + pFA
, (8)
which is also known as the Bayesian detection rate [32].
To model CKB and CIG, we proceed as follows. For CKB,
we computed CI-tuples for each experiment using CVX and
Gurobi, packages for specifying and solving convex and mix-
integer programs [33]. CIG detects possible threats based on
deviation from the pseudo-measurements P pred , which are
generated from a uniform distribution in [0.9Pd, 1.1Pd]. We
assume no redundant measurements are available for CIG to
replace the corrupted measurements. Nevertheless, if they are
available, the false alarms (for CIG) will tend to 0.
CKB and CIG will label an incoming MCA as a threat, if the
attack can increase the flow τl = 15% in any of the following
target lines L = {3, 4, 13, 18, 25, 29, 30, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46}
(see Fig. 7). This requires for CKB to have CI-tuples for each
line l ∈ L..
3) Metrics: The performance of the benchmark IDSs and
the proposed framework is measured by the false negative rate
FNR := FN/(TP+FN), where FN denotes the false negatives
(i.e., failure of generating an alarm) and TP the true positives
(i.e., success of generating an alarm correctly), and the false
positive rate FPR := FP/(TN + FP), where FP denotes the
false positives (i.e., generating a false alarm) and TN the true
negatives (i.e., stay silent when there is no event).
We further define these metrics for intrusions that are not
a threat (i.e., ineffective attacks) and for intrusions that are a
threat (denoted as FNRt and FPRt). Since IDS-1 and IDS-
2 are not capable of estimating attack consequences and
determining possible threats, we compute FNRt and FPRt only
for the proposed framework. All metrics are evaluated through
a large sample of events using the pseudo-code algorithm
described in Appendix B.
B. Experimental Results
Experiment I: False Alarm Rates. In this experiment, we
computed the FNR and FPR for IDS-1, IDS-2, and CKB/CIG.
We used the pseudo-code to simulate M = 102 experiments
of N = 103 attack/normal events. Fig. 8 shows the FNRs
and Fig. 9 the FPRs (using box plots) for the attack rates
pˆ0 ∈ {0.25, 0.05}.
For the FNR case, the results show that for both pˆ0 = 0.25
and pˆ0 = 0.05, CKB/CIG outperforms IDS-2 but not IDS-
1. This is because CKB and CIG label an event as an
intrusion if and only if the event threatens the power grid.
As a result, ineffective attacks are not labeled as intrusions,
which increases the number of false negatives. If instead of
computing the FNR for intrusions, we compute the FNR for
threats (i.e., FNRt), then we will see how CKB and CIG
outperform IDSs with no contextual information, which we
describe in Experiment II.
For the FPR case, the results show that for pˆ0 = 0.25,
CKB/CIG performs worse than for IDS-1 and IDS-2. In a
more friendly environment, i.e., when pˆ0 = 0.05, CKB/CIG
outperforms IDS-1 but not IDS-2. This is because (i) the fast
screening of CKB increases the number of false positives in
a less friendly environment and (ii) CKB is sensitive to the
number of critical targets (i.e., the cardinality of L), which we
describe in Experiment III.
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Fig. 8. FNR for IDS-1, IDS-2, and CKB/CIG
Experiment II: Threat Analysis. In this experiment, we
computed the FNR for threats (i.e., FNRt). A false negative
occurs if the random MCA was a threat for the power grid
but CKB and CIG determined that it was not a threat. Fig. 10
shows the FNRs for the attack rates pˆ0 ∈ {0.25, 0.1, 0.05}. As
expected, the contextual information used by CKB and CIG
considerably decreases the FNR for threats.
Experiment III: Sensitivity Analysis. In this experiment, we
studied the sensitivity of FPRt to the cardinality of L. Table I
shows that the average FPRt, denoted as µ(FPRt), decreases as
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Fig. 10. FNRt-Threat analysis.
TABLE I
SENSITIVITY OF FPRt .
τl L µ(FPRt)
10 % {3, 4, 13, 18, 25, 30, 42, 44, 45, 46} 0.1806
20 % {3, 4, 13, 18, 25, 30, 36, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46} 0.1774
20 % {3, 4, 25, 30, 45, 46} 0.0625
30 % {4, 13, 18, 25, 42, 45, 46} 0.0646
30 % {25, 46} 0.0351
40 % {13} 0.0190
the number of critical/target lines decreases. This is because, as
the number of critical lines decreases, the number of CI-tuples
stored in CKB decreases too. As a result, the fast scanning
feature of CKB will be less prone to false positives.
Note that there is a trade-off between the number of critical
targets selected and the maximum FPRt allowed, which should
be adjusted based on risk assessment or experience. A different
solution would be to always use CIG. This, however, will
greatly increase the runtime of our proposed framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a semantic analysis framework
for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) against Monitor-Control
Attacks (MCA) in power grids. The framework has two parts
running in parallel with IDS: A Correlation Index Genera-
tor (CIG) that analyzes the correlation of potential hostile
behaviors and indexes these behaviors, and a Correlation
Knowledge-Base (CKB) that is updated with the Indices gen-
erated by CIG. The performance of the proposed framework is
evaluated under different attack scenarios in a cyber-physical
setting. It is shown that the proposed framework is capable
of detecting MCA and estimating attack consequences with
promising runtime and detection accuracy. In addition, the
experiments show that the detection outcome of the proposed
framework is sensitive to both the size and locations of attack
goals. Future work includes developing methods, which adapt
CKB parameter settings to attack activities, to achieve an
optimal trade-off between the FNR/FPR and detection runtime.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. Suppose, to get a contradiction, that S′ := Sα,j \ {s∗k}
is an effective MCA. Thus, S′ ⊂ Sα,j is a correlated MCA
with cardinality |S′| < |Sα,j | =: κ∗, which contradicts the
fact that Sα,j is a strongly correlated MCA, i.e., a CI with
minimum cardinality. This proves the proposition.
APPENDIX B
PSEUDO-CODE
We use Algorithm 1 to compute the FNR/FNRt and
FPR/FPRt for CIG and CKB. Some remarks on Algorithm 1
are the following. (i) The if-conditionals describe how the E-
blocks, CKB, and CIG interact during normal/attack events.
(ii) Algorithm 1 describes attacks at the grid level, that is,
either the grid is under attack Sα,j or not. We remark, however,
that it can be easily adapted to model attacks at the substation
level, that is, individual substations are under attack or not.
(iii) Finally, by making the appropriate changes, Algorithm 1
can compute the FNR and FPR for IDS-1 and IDS-2.
Algorithm 1 Deriving FNR and FPR for CKB/CIG
1: (FNR, FPR)← Rates( )
2: procedure RATES( )
3: for k = 1 to M do ⊲ M: number of experiments
4: for i = 1 to N do ⊲ N: number of attack/normal events
5: Select p1 ∈ [pˆ0 − δ, pˆ0 + δ]
6: Select p2 ∈ [0, β]
7: Select p3 ∈ [0, α]
8: Attack(i)← Bernoulli(p1) ⊲ Initiate attack/normal event
9: if Attack(i) = 1 then ⊲ Attack event
10: [Sα,j , P˜d(a)] ← RandomMCA
11: ZD ← Bernoulli(p2) ⊲ ZD: zero-day attack
12: Alarm ← Bernoulli(min{1− ZD, pD})
13: if Alarm = 1 then
14: [ Threat(i),isMCA ] ← CKB(Sα,j )
15: if isMCA = No then
16: Threat(i) ← CIG(Sα,j , P˜d(a))
17: end if
18: else ⊲ Zero-day attack case
19: Threat(i) ← CIG(∅, P˜d(a))
20: end if
21: else ⊲ Normal event
22: FA ← Bernoulli(p3 ) ⊲ FA: false alarm
23: Alarm ← Bernoulli(max{FA, pFA})
24: if Alarm = 0 then
25: Threat(i) ← CIG(∅, P˜d)
26: else ⊲ False alarm case
27: [Sα,j , P˜d] ← RandomMCA
28: [ Threat(i),isMCA ] ← CKB(Sα,j )
29: if isMCA = No then
30: Threat(i) ← CIG(Sα,j , P˜d)
31: end if
32: end if
33: end if
34: end for
35: FN, FP, TN, TP ← from Attack and Threat
36: Compute FNR(k) and FPR(k)
37: end for
38: return(FNR,FPR)
39: end procedure
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